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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This suit was instituted to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while engaged in an attempt
to apprehend two of the defendants, who were caught by
the plaintiff stealing gasoline. The case was tried before
a jury which returned a verdict of "no cause of action."
Judgment was entered on the verdict and the court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. This
appeal is taken from the judgment and from the order
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denying the motion for new trial. Appellant's principal
assignments of error relate to the instructions given and
those refused by the court. It is plaintiff's contention that
the court's instructions failed to present the plaintiff's
theory of the case to the jury ; shifted the burden of proof
on the affirmative defenses; incorrectly instructed on the
law of the case, and, under the circumstances, were tantamount to a directed verdict against the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence. It is admitted,
however, that on the night in question, plaintiff was injured
while trying to apprehend two juveniles, one 16 and one
18, who were caught "red handed" stealing gas from a truck
on East 48th South Street. It is also admitted that one of
the defendants while trying to escape drove the "escape
car" out of control West on 48th South to a point where
it struck a 16 inch power pole, shearing it off and knocking
the live wires down onto ·the ground. While this car was
accelerating down the street, plaintiff was hanging onto
the side, trying to get the driver to stop. When the car hit
the pole, plaintiff was knocked off, sustaining injury.
The dispute in the evidence relates to the motives and
reasons for running out of control down 48th South Street.
The defendant J ongsma generally claims he was so frightened he didn't know what he was doing. The plaintiff, on
the other hand claims that the defendant tried to get away
and to frighten the plaintiff and in the process, intentionally
drove his automobile directly at the plaintiff. A more de-
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tailed inspection of the evidence reveals the nature of the
dispute.
The Appellant, Mr. D. Paul Ferguson, lives on East
48th South Street, a short distance east of the little town
of Holladay. He has lived in this neighborhood for several
years. Prior to the time of the incident complained of, he
had been a Deputy County Sheriff of Salt Lake County.
At the actual time of his injury, which was on a Friday
night, he was on leave of absence and scheduled to return
to his employment as a deputy sheriff on the following
Monday. Because he was known in his neighborhood as a
deputy sheriff, his neighbors had brought to him during
the summer, complaints about gas being stolen from their
cars. The Broadheads, who lived across the street, had
complained to him on several occasions about gas being
stolen from their truck, which was customarily parked on
the street.
On August 30, 1956, he and his seventeen year old son
returned to their home from a drive-in theatre at about
11:00 o'clock p. m. After plaintiff got into the house, his
son came in and told him that someone was trying to steal
gas from the Broadhead truck, which was parked directly
across the street from the plaintiff's home. Plaintiff thereupon got the revolver, which he used as a deputy sheriff,
and a flash light, and went outside for the purpose of apprehending the culprits (R. 25). Before taking the revolver,
he made sure it was unloaded (R. 27). He took the revolver
with him for the psycological reason of apprehending whoever was stealing the gas.
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When he got out onto the street, he saw an automobile
parked on the north side of the street with one of the young
defendants by the name of Jeffrey Paul J ongsma sitting
at the wheel. He, of course, could not identify the defendant
at that time. He saw the legs of the other defendant,
Vaughn William Kay, whom he also could not identify at
that time, over by the truck near the gas tank (R. 28).
Plaintiff shouted, "Both of you come out where I am."
When neither answered, he said, "You, under the truck,
come on out here." The J ongsma boy in the car said, "Tell
him to go to hell, and if he runs around either end of the
truck, you run around the other, and take off" (R. 30).
Neither of the defendants came out as ordered, so the
plaintiff "stood right there" where he could observe both
cars. After a few seconds had elapsed, the auto on the north
side of the street started to move forward slowly (R. 32).
The lights were off. When the automobile got close to the
plaintiff, plaintiff turned the flash light on the gun so the
driver could see it, and said, "Stop, or I will shoot." The
driver of the car thereupon turned the car directly toward
him and accelerated it "greatly" (R. 33). The plaintiff
stood in his position without moving until the car got close,
at which time, he took one step aside. As he did so, the
driver's door was thrown open in a forceful manner. The
plaintiff put his arms out to protect himself. Fortunately,
because the car window was down, his arms went through
the open space. When the plaintiff struck the door, it
caused the door to close, leaving the plaintiff hanging on
with his arms hanging over the door, holding the flash light
in one hand and the gun in the other (R: 34).
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There was no running board on the car, so that plaintiff was left hanging helplessly on the side of the door with
no place for his feet, and his hands holding the flash light
and gun as indicated. The plaintiff described to the jury
the way on which he was hanging on the side of the car (R.
35). In this position, he could not move and kept telling
the driver to stop. Instead of stopping, the driver told him,
"To go to hell" (R. 36).
While plaintiff was hanging helplessly on the side of
the car, as described, the car continued to move down the
street toward Holladay. Plaintiff looked for a place to drop
off, but because there was a car parked on the south side
of 48th South, he was afraid to let go. By the time the
escaping car had passed the parked automobile, it was going
too fast and plaintiff couldn't get off. All during this time
he kept begging the defendant J ongsma to stop, but instead
of doing so, J ongsma leaned away from the plaintiff, down
onto the seat, and while in this "blind" position kept accelerating the car (R. 37).
As the automobile approached a large power pole, located on the south side of the street, plaintiff cried, "For
God's sake look out for that power pole." The moving automobile thereupon ran into the power pole and sheared it
off near the base (R. 38). When the automobile struck the
pole and sheared it off, it knocked plaintiff flying to the
ground, where he rolled for several feet. Hot wires from
the pole fell around him, but fortunately he was not burned.
The automobile, which had been retarded by striking the
pole, came to a stop a few feet short of running over the
plaintiff, who was lying helplessly on the ground.
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The plaintiff identified on Exhibit "1", the location
of the power pole, the location of the parked car and the
position he was in when he finally fell from the side of
defendants' automobile.
He testified that when the automobile struck the pole
it was going at a speed of approximately 40 miles per hour
(R. 41 to 44).
When the automobile came to a stop, the defendant
J ongsma came out the right door and ran up 48th South
Street. The plaintiff, not realizing how badly he had been
hurt, took off in pursuit. He was unable to catch the defendant, who disappeared behind some houses (R. 48).
Plaintiff gave up the chase at his driveway, and told his
son to call the sheriff's office. The police arrived about
12 :30 p. m. Prior to the time they arrived, the defendant
Kay, who had also fled from the scene returned to the area
where he was identified by the plaintiff's son.
When the deputy sheriff arrived he apprehended the
defendant Kay. The defendant Jongsma turned himself in
the next morning.
Shortly after the accident occurred, the plaintiff realized that he had been injured and went to the office of Dr.
Ronald King in Holladay. At that time he observed that
he had a very sore left arm, a bad cut and bruise on the
right buttocks, pain in his groin and pain in his right leg.
In fact he had stiffened up so much, that he could not walk
(R. 52).
When he was examined at the doctor's office, he also
noted a large bruise in his groin; later his right leg turned
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black and blue from his hip to the knee; his clothes were
badly torn.
The seriousness of the injury resulted from a prior
condition which had existed and which was badly aggravated by the injury. Prior to the night of the injury, plaintiff had had a perforated ulcer. This ulcer had been treated
and the treatment had been completed (R. 54).
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff had been in
excellent health. Shortly after the accident the plaintiff
began to observe a nauseous feeling in his stomach, nervousness, and an upset condition. He immediately went
home and remained in bed. He couldn't even sit up. He
was unable to sleep for two nights and remained in bed
during the day. Because of the nauseous feeling he was
unable to eat.
On the Sunday evening following his injury, after he
had been in bed for approximately two days, he returned to
his job at the sheriff's office. When he returned to work,
he had the same nauseous feeling, and was generally upset.
However, as it was his first day of work following his leave
of absence, he felt impelled to return to duty. After he had
worked a couple of hours, his condition became so bad that
he had to go to the hospital, where he remained 8 days.
While in the hospital, he vomited blood several times and
had to have 5 transfusions. At one time his condition became critical.
After returning to his home from the hospital, he remained in bed about a week or 10 days (R. 58 to 60). Since
the accident, he has been very nervous and irritable, and
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on a bland diet, known as ulcer diet no. 5. Ulcer diet no. 5
apparently consists of baby food (R. 60).
The plaintiff described other symptoms he has, which
were caused by the reperforation of this ulcer, which are
not important in this appeal.
The version of the accident given by the two boys differs from the version given by the plaintiff in several
respects. They admit that they were stealing gas at the
time plaintiff came from his home. The defendant Kay was
unable to relate much about the accident as he was fleeing
at the time the accident occurred.
The defendant J ongsma, however, explained to the
jury that he was 16 years of age, married, and that on the
night that the injuries occurred he and Vaughn Kay were
stealing gas from the automobile owned by the Broadheads
on East 48th South (R. 120). They had a can and a hose,
which they used in a syphon operation to steal the gas. They
kept the can and hose in the back seat of their car.
The plan was that J ongsma would sit behind the driver's seat in the parked car while Kay would steal the gas
from the truck. While they were engaged in this operation,
the plaintiff Ferguson came out onto the street. When he
came out, the defendant Kay was hammering with a hammer on the gas cap, which was locked. He saw the plaintiff
Ferguson standing in the street about 25 or 30 feet down
the road. According to J ongsma, when Ferguson came out,
he stopped in the middle of the road and yelled, "You come
out of there, you son of a bitch."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

According to J ongsma's testimony neither he, nor the
defendant Kay said anything in response to this order. He
denied that he told the plaintiff Ferguson to go to hell, and
denied that he told Ferguson, "If he comes around either end
of the truck to run" (R. 125 to 126). He admits, however,
that when he saw Ferguson standing in the middle of the
road, he attempted to escape. When he did so, he claims
Ferguson said, "Stop, or I will blow your head off." At this
time he could see both the flash light and the gun.
He said that it was his intention to drive on past the
plaintiff. He denied that he drove toward the plaintiff. He
said, "When the plaintiff said, Stop or I will blow your
head off,-the plaintiff was standing in the middle of the
road." He admitted he accelerated his car, but only gradually (R. 129). He had no idea how fast he was going. He
said as he proceeded past plaintiff, plaintiff grabbed the
door with his arm, putting his hands around the post of
the car (R. 130). When the plaintiff grabbed onto the post
of the car, he said the door swung open. He did not at any
time attempt to stop, even though he said the plaintiff kept
saying, "Stop or I will blow your head off." While he had
his arms around the post, the door came open (R. 131).
When the door came open, the plaintiff was hanging onto
the post of the door with both arms. Even though the plaintiff was in this position, he did not attempt to slow down
his car, but in fact continued to accelerate it.
He was unable to remember how fast he had been going, but did remember that when he turned himself in the
next morning, he told the officers he was going forty miles
per hour.
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The defendant J ongsma was not corroborated by anyone. Parts of his testimony are directly in conflict with
the testimony of the plaintiff, who was corroborated. Furthermore, the defendant Jongsma's testimony conflicts with
itself. He was first called as an adverse witness by the
plaintiff. In this testimony he stated, "The door was loose,
and when he put his arm through the door it came openthrough the window." And again: Q. And when he put
that arm in that pulled the door open? A. Yes. Q. And
then he was able to get both arms around the door? A. Yes.
Q. Which is now open? A. Yes" (R. 133-134).
Mr. Strong thereafter called the defendant J ongsma as
his witness. The defendant then testified exactly contrary
to his first testimony. He was asked: Q. "Now at any time
after Mr. Ferguson got on this car did the door on which
he was hanging come open?" A. No !
It did appear from the testimony of Jongsma, that
while he claimed the plaintiff jumped onto the side of the
car, he admitted that there was no place to hang on-no
running board, and that the plaintiff had a gun in one
hand and a flash light in the other (R. 212).

The significance of the open door is that plaintiff
claimed the door was thrown open at him and that to protect himself he threw out his hands and was caught on the
side of the car when his body knocked the door closed.
Suit was brought against the Jongsma boy as the driver
of the automobile. The Kay boy was joined on the theory of
joint venture and the fathers of each of the boys were joined
under the motor vehicle act.
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The case was submitted to the jury on the court's instructions and the jury returned a verdict of "no cause of
action."

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY
THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NO
DEFENSE TO WILFUL, WANTON OR RECKLESS MISCONDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD
TO THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND
RECKLESS CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS.

POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16, WHICH
INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF THE
CASE AND SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ON THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

POINT III.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 17,
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18, 19 AND 20 WHICH INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK
TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND IGNORED
THE ALLEGED WILFUL AND RECKLESS
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT JONGSMA
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CHARGE THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO
SAID CONDUCT.
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTORISTS TO
DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.
POINT V.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7, PERTAINING TO THE
DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CONFRONTED WITH SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED PERIL.
POINT VI.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT
KAY WITH REFERENCE TO CONVERSATIONS, WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE APPELLANT'S INJURIES.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO CHARGE THE JURY
THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NO
DEFENSE TO WILFUL, WANTON OR RECKLESS MISCONDUCT AND IN CHARGING THE
JURY ON SAID DEFENSE WITHOUT REGARD
TO THE ALLEGED WILFUL, WANTON AND
RECKLESS CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS.
It was the theory of plaintiff's counsel from the outset
that the conduct of the Jongsma boy exceeded mere negligence and that contributory negligence was therefore no
defense. The complaint sought punitive damages alleging
that the conduct involved was "wilful, reckless and wanton"
(R. 3). The pretrial order clearly set forth the plaintiff's
position as follows (R. 12) :

"The plaintiff claims that the defendants may
not rely on the defense [s] of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk because the acts of the defendant, Jeffrey Paul Jongsma, as complained of,
constitute a gross negligence and wilful and wanton
misconduct."
Plaintiff's evidence, if believed, fully supported the allegations of wilful, wanton and reckless conduct. According to
plaintiff's version of the case the J ongsma boy drove the
automobile directly at the plaintiff; threw open the door
to strike him as plaintiff stepped aside, and then drove the
automobile down the street at a high rate of speed on the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

wrong side of the road without heed to the helpless position of the plaintiff until the automobile struck a utility
pole. Although it was not claimed that the J ongsma boy
did these things with a specific intent to harm the plaintiff, it was and is urged that such conduct amounted to a
reckless disregard for plaintiff's safety. Under these facts
the plaintiff was entitled to an instruction that contributory
negligence is not available to one guilty of wilful, reckless
or wanton conduct. The court not only failed to so instruct
the jury upon plaintiff's request, but instead expressly
instructed the jury that plaintiff was not entitled to recover
if he was found guilty of contributory negligence.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 12 is as follows:
"You are instructed that it is no defense so far
as the injuries to l\1:r. Ferguson are concerned that
he was guilty of negligence contributing to his injuries, if the conduct of the defendant Jeffrey
J ongsma in the operation of the Ford automobile
amounted to wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness.
"In this regard if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Jeffrey
J ongsma intentionally turned the automobile he was
operating in the direction of the plaintiff and drove
said automobile directly at the plaintiff or that the
defendant J ongsma intentionally opened the door of
the car he was operating in an attempt to strike the
plaintiff with said door and if you further find from
a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct
on the part of the said J ongsma was a proximate
cause of the injuries of plaintiff, then you are instructed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover regardless of any negligence on his part.
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"Jensen v. Railroad Company, 44 Utah 100, 138
Pac. 1185. Restatement of Torts, Section 482."
The plaintiff was entitled to have his theory of the
case presented to the jury under proper and applicable instructions. Requested Instruction No. 12 was such an instruction. It stated in effect that if defendants were guilty
of such conduct as claimed by plaintiff, contributory negligence was not a defense. That this is a correct statement
of the law is clear. It is so stated in Vol. 38, Am. Jur., Page
854, as follows :
"Section 178.-Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct.-There is an abundance of authority for the
proposition that contributory negligence is not a defense in an action based upon wilful or wanton misconduct or intentional violence. Even in jurisdictions where the doctrine of comparative negligence
is rejected as a general principle of the common law,
contributory negligence is no defense to an action
based on the defendant's reckless, wilful, wanton, or
intentional misconduct. There is no more reason for
permitting the defense of contributory negligence in
a case where the injury was caused by wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, than there is for permitting it in a case of assault and battery. No court
has questioned the soundness of this proposition so
far as injuries intentionally inflicted are concerned.
So far as wanton conduct is concerned, some discernment must be exercised by the courts, or the defense
of contributory negligence will be barred in any
case merely by the artifice of describing the conduct
of the defendant as wanton. * * *"
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The same rule is clearly stated by Cooley, Vol. 2, Cooley
on Torts, 3rd Ed., Page 1442, as follows :
"Where the conduct of the defendant is wanton
and wilful, or where it indicates that degree of indifference to the rights of others which may justly
be characterized as recklessness, the doctrine of contributory negligence has no place whatever, * * *"
The foregoing statement by Cooley was approved by
Justice Straup in speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court
in Jensen v. Railroad Company, 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185.
A case somewhat analogous to the facts in this case is
Laconia v. D'Angelo, (N.J. L.), 142 A. 46, 58 A. L. R. 614,
where the facts were as follows: A trespassing plaintiff
who was a minor sued the defendant, owner of a vehicle,
for injuries he sustained when he was knocked off of the
defendant's automobile. The plaintiff apparently hollered
at the defendant and said, "Give me a ride." The defendant
said nothing, so the boy jumped on the side of the car. At
that the automobile was going very slowly. After he got
on, the car started to go rapidly and later when he asked
the driver to stop, he said, "* * * and then I saw a
hand come around and push me off." The lower court had
granted a nonsuit on the theory that the plaintiff was a
trespasser. The upper court, in reversing the lower court,
said:
"Now it is perfectly obvious under the testimony that when the car slowed up the boy jumped
on the running board, that it was thereafter propelled quite fast, and when he called out to have it
stopped he was deliberately pushed off by the driver.
In these circumstances, there can be no other con-
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elusion but that, by reckless indifference to consequences, the driver consciously and intentionally did
the wrongful act of ejecting the boy from the car,
where the latter appears to have been a trespasser,
by deliberately pushing him off."
The court clearly recognized in the foregoing case that the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff would not bar his
recovery.
In the instant case the court apparently recognized that
there was evidence of misconduct which exceeded simple
negligence by instructing the jury on the issue of punitive
damages in Instruction No. 26 and in defining recklessness
in Instruction No. 27. If the jury had found, as they certainly could have done under applicable and proper instructions that defendants or either of them were guilty of misconduct either wilful or wanton or reckless, then contributory negligence would have no applicability.
Even though this is clearly the law the court, as herein
indicated, failed to so instruct and in fact told the jury that
if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence he
could not recover. It was so stated in the court's Instruction No. 16 where defendants' theory as contained in defendants' requested Instruction No. 4 was given verbatim.
In this requested instruction the jury was told that if the
defendant, Jeffery Paul J ongsma, was negligent plaintiff
could recover only if the plaintiff himself was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

It is thus apparent that the court not only failed to
instruct on the plaintiff's theory of the case, but instructed,
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contrary to law, in direct contradiction to said theory. We
submit that the plaintiff is entitled to have his case submitted to a jury under correct instructions on the law of the
case and the theory of the pleadings.

POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16, WHICH
INCORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF THE
CASE AND SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ON THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
That part of Instruction No. 16 pertinent to this assignment of error reads as follows:
"Instruction No. 16
"In this action before you may return a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
Jeffrey Paul J ongsma, Jacob J. J ongsma and Vaughn
William Kay, you must find from a preponderance
of the evidence that each of the following three propositions are true:
["Proposition No. 1 : That defendant J ongsma
was negligent. Proposition No. 2: That said negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries,
and]
"Proposition No. 3: That the plaintiff himself
'zcas not guilty of contributory negligence and that
the plaintiff, by his action and conduct, did not assume the risk of the occurrence as hereinafter defined."
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This instruction is in all material respects identical to defendants' requested Instruction No. 4 (R. 241). Exception
to the instruction was taken by counsel for both parties ( R.
228, 230). By this charge the court instructs the jury in
plain and simple language that plaintiff is not entitled to
recover unless they find "from a preponderance of the evidence that * * * the plaintiff himself was not guilty
of contributory negligence and that the plaintiff, by his
action and conduct, did not assume the risk * * *." The
charge shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to negative the defendants' allegations of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk. It clearly instructs the jurors that
plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless from a preponderance of the evidence they find that plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence and had not assumed the risk.
In other words under this instruction had the jury found
the evidence evenly balanced on the issues of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover. Such an instruction is manifestly erroneous for the defendants had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence each of the affirmative defenses on which they relied and if the jury found the evidence evenly balanced on these issues the plaintiff was entitled to prevail thereon.
This court has held that an erroneous specific instruction on the burden of proof constitutes prejudicial error
and is not cured by a general instruction which when viewed
with the specific instruction can only serve to confuse and
mislead the jury. State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 267, 258 P.
2d 452; See also Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 366,
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270 Pac. 349; Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, 6 Utah 2d 155, 307 P. 2d 1045; State v.
Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P. 2d 647. We submit that this error
is so glaring that no extended argument is necessary to
demonstrate either the fact of error or its prejudicial nature.
POINT III.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 16, 17,
18, 19 AND 20 WHICH INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMED RISK
TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND IGNORED
THE ALLEGED WILFUL AND RECKLESS
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT JONGSMA
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CHARGE THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO
SAID CONDUCT.
By instructions Nos. 16 through 20 inclusive, the court
undertook to define with reference to the facts, exactly what
would constitute assumed risk on the part of the plaintiff
which would bar his recovery.
Instruction No. 16 charged the jury that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of the defendant J ongsma's negligence if
he substantially interfered with the vision of the said defendant by flashing a lighted flash light in his face [without regard to whether or not said interference, if any, was
intentionally caused].
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Instruction No. 17 directed the jury that if the plaintiff pointed a revolver at Jongsma's head and threatened
to kill him, such conduct would amount to assumed risk,
if J ongsma became frightened thereby.
Instruction No. 18 charged the jury that if the plaintiff
had an opportunity to move from the path of the vehicle,
but failed to do so, that such conduct would constitute assumed risk.
Instruction No. 19 directed the jury that if the plaintiff jumped onto the automobile and attempted to hang
thereon-he was negligent and assumed the risk as a matter
of law.
Instruction No. 20 directed the jury that if the plaintiff
had an opportunity to detach himself from the automobile,
but failed to do so, then he assumed the risk and was barred
from recovery.
Each of these instructions wholly fail to apprise the
jury of the ultimate facts which they must find in order to
substantiate the defense of assumed risk, and each of said
instructions is a bald-faced usurpation of the jury's prerogative in determining the ultimate facts and weighing
the evidence.
We submit that the doctrine of assumed risk has no
application whatsoever to the facts of the instant case, but
even assuming, arguendo, that such a defense might have
some application, it is well settled that the jurors are the
sole judges of the ultimate facts necessary to establish said
defense. If assumed risk was an appropriate defense, the
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court's instruction No. 23 properly directed the jury as to
the facts, which they must find in order to establish the
defense. Instruction No. 23 was taken from the Jury Instruction Forms For Utah, and charges the jury that in
order to find assumed risk they must find by a preponderance of the evidence that ( 1) the plaintiff's words or conduct clearly indicated that he knew of the danger created
by the conduct of the defendant and (2) that he voluntarily
subjected himself thereto and that he consented that if injury resulted, the defendant should be relieved of any liability therefor.
It is obvious that the court had no prerogative to instruct the jury that the conduct of the plaintiff as set forth
in the instructions 16 through 20, constituted assumed risk
as a matter of law, without regard to the motives or intent
of the plaintiff and the various possible explanations for
his conduct. As a practical matter, we submit that said
instructions under the circumstances amounted to a directed
verdict for the defendants.
For example, it was clear from the evidence that the
plaintiff got onto the automobile and failed to detach himself before the collision; that he had a revolver and a lighted
flash light in his hand, and that some threat had been made.
Can the jury be properly instructed as a matter of law to
determine from these facts that the plaintiff voluntarily
assumed the risk of defendant's reckless and wanton conduct?
The error in these instructions consists not only in
improperly defining what is an assumption of risk, but
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also in improperly making applicable the doctrine of assumption of risk to a person engaged in the arrest of criminals.
We believe that the doctrine of assumption of risk is
inapplicable to the facts of this case. If the plaintiff had
a right to arrest or apprehend the defendants as the court
instructed the jurors in Instruction No. 13, then any risk
he might have undertaken in accomplishing what he had a
right to do would not be a defense to the defendants. The
rule is stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume 1, Page 245, as follows:
"The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting his arrest and the arrest thereby
effected are privileged if all the conditions stated
in §§ 119 to 132, in so far as they are applicable,
exist."
Under "b." of the Comment at Page 248, the following
is stated:
"* * * Where a privilege to arrest exists,
it justifies not only the confinement but also any
conduct which is reasonably necessary to effect the
arrest."
From the foregoing it is clear that if the plaintiff had
a right to arrest and apprehend the defendants he was justified in doing anything which was reasonably necessary to
effect that end. Therefore, instructing the jury as the court
did, misled the jurors into believing that if the plaintiff
assumed the risk, which of course in one sense he did when
he attempted to apprehend the defendants, he could not
recover. We submit that this is not, and should not be the
law. It is one thing to talk of assumption of risk in guest
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cases under the Utah Guest Statute, and quite another to
preclude one who has a right to assume the risk of making
an arrest from recovery because he exercises his right.
If the court's instructions are correct on assumption of

risk, then one who has a right to apprehend or arrest cannot recover against an escaping defendant for any injuries incurred if the act or acts of apprehension were risky.
We submit that making an arrest or apprehending criminals is by its very nature risky.
The plaintiff in the case now before this court was
placed in a dilemma by the court's instructions. He had a
right to apprehend and arrest the defendants, but if he
exercised his right by failing to get out of their way, or if
he jumped on their car to accomplish his purpose he assumed the risk, and could not recover. We submit that this
is not the law.
The instructions on assumption of risk were not only
inapplicable to the facts of the case at bar and erroneous
in their application of the law to the said facts, but wholly
failed to account for the effect of the wilful, reckless and
wanton misconduct of the defendant J ongsma.
The plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 11, reads as
follows:
"You are instructed that it is no defense so far
as the injuries to Mr. Ferguson are concerned that
he voluntarily assumed the risk of injury, if the
conduct of the defendant Jeffery Jongsma in the
operation of the Ford automobile amounted to wilfulness and wantonness."
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"In this regard if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Jeffery
J ongsma intentionally turned the automobile he was
operating in the direction of the plaintiff and drove
said automobile directly at the plaintiff or that the
defendant J ongsma intentionally opened the door of
the car he was operating in an attempt to strike the
plaintiff with said door and if you further find from
a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct
on the part of the said J ongsma was wilful and
wanton and was a proximate cause of the injuries of
plaintiff, then you are instructed that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover regardless of any assumption
of risk on his part."
In Restatement of the Law of Torts, Valume 2, Page
1262, Section 482, the following is stated under "Comment:"
"a. If the defendant's conduct amounts to
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety as those
words are defined in § 500, the plaintiff is not
barred from recovery by any form of contributory
negligence. He is not barred from recovery by his
failure to exercise reasonable vigilance, although
had he done so he would have discovered the defendant's reckless misconduct in time to have avoided
harm therefrom. He is not barred from recovery by
a failure to exercise reasonable care and competence
after he knows of the defendant's reckless misconduct and realizes the dangers involved herein. The
plaintiff is not barred even by tha.t form of negligence which is called voluntary assumption of risk.
In order that the plaintiff's conduct may bar him
from recovery, it is necessary that he not only know
of the defendant's reckless conduct but also realize
the gravity of the risk involved therein so that he
is not only unreasonable but reckless in exposing
himself to it."
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The Restatement in effect states that unless the conduct of the plaintiff is itself reckless even though it comes
under the heading of assumption of risk, it will not bar
recovery.
In the instant case the court in giving some of defendants' requests actually instructed the jurors that if the
"plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care
had an opportunity to move from the path of the vehicle
* * * but failed to do so * * * then he assumed
the risk" (Instruction No. 18) . In Instruction No. 20 the
jurors were told that if plaintiff "had an opportunity in
the exercise of reasonable care to detach himself" from
the car but failed to do so then he assumed the risk.
We submit that a verdict cannot be allowed to stand
under such obviously erroneous and prejudicial instructions.
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE LAW REQUIRES MOTORISTS TO
DRIVE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.
The plaintiff's complaint alleged several acts of negligence and recklessness as grounds for recovery. These were
set out clearly in the pretrial order. One of the acts complained of was that J ongsma drove the automobile on the
wrong side of the road. As a matter of fact, this was the
very act which caused the collision with the telephone pole
resulting in plaintiff's injuries. By his requested Instruc-
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tion No. 8, the plaintiff requested the court to instruct the
jury as follows:
"Instruction No. 8. You are instructed that the
laws of the State of Utah require that upon all roadways of sufficient width motor vehicles shall be
driven upon the right half of the roadway with certain exceptions not pertinent to the case before you.
In this regard if you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant Jeffery J ongsma
drove the Ford automobile on the left half of 4800
South Street and that his conduct in this regard was
negligence, and if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, then I
instruct you to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff
and assess damages in accordance with these instructions unless you find that plaintiff is barred
from recovery by his own conduct. 41-6-53, U. C. A.,
1953."
The court refused to give this instruction either in
whole or in substance. The court's refusal to so instruct
deprived the plaintiff from getting his complete theory of
the case to the jury. There is certainly no question but
what the instruction correctly states the law and from the
evidence there can be no doubt that J ongsma actually did
drive the automobile on the wrong side of the roadway.
The only hint in the instructions that J ongsma might
be found negligent in driving his automobile on the wrong
side of the road was contained in the court's Instruction No.
16 given at the request of the defendants. The pertinent
portion of this instruction required the jury to find that
Jongsma "knowingly" drove the automobile on the wrong
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side of the road. This instruction not only failed to put the
plaintiff's theory to the jury but stated an incorrect proposition of law with regard thereto. It is elementary that in
order to constitute negligence it is not necessary that an act
be committed knowingly. If the defendant either knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that
the automobile which he was operating was being driven on
the wrong side of the road, he was guilty of negligence.
If properly instructed, the jury might well have found

under the circumstances of this case that the operation by
Jongsma of the Ford automobile on the wrong side of the
road was negligence and that this negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This being true, it
seems inescapable that the failure of the court to instruct
the jury in this regard constituted prejudicial error.

POINT V.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7, PERTAINING TO THE
DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WHEN CONFRONTED WITH SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED PERIL.
Under the plaintiff's testimony Jongsma suddenly
turned the Ford automobile in the direction of the plaintiff
and drove the same directly at him. Counsel for defendant
attempted to make much of the fact that the plaintiff did
not run out of the path of the vehicle as soon as it was
turned in his direction, contending that Ferguson had a
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duty to get out of the path of the automobile and failing
was negligent. Even assuming that such a duty existed,
which we deny, the duty should have been considered in
the light of all the circumstances. Mr. Ferguson frankly
stated that had he run to the side of the road as soon as the
automobile was turned in his direction he could probably
have placed himself out of danger. Being placed in a position of sudden and unexpected peril, however, the law does
not require that he exercise· the same judgment and prudence in that situation that may be required of him in more
calm and deliberate moments. In order to insure that the
jury properly understood the law applicable to this situation, the plaintiff requested the following instruction :
"Instruction No. 7. A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly
confronted with peril arising from either the actual
presence or the appearance of eminent danger to
himself or to others is not expected nor required to
use the same judgment and prudence that may be
required of him in calmer and more deliberate moments."
"In such a situation, his duty is to exercise only
the degree of care which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. If at that moment he exercises such
care he does all the law requires of him, even though
in the light of after events it may appear that a different choice and manner of action would have been
better and safer. If, in this case, you find that the
plaintiff was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted
with such a situation and the action which they took
to avoid the accident was such as an ordinary prudent person would have exercised under the same
or similar circumstances then he was not guilty of
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negligence in so acting although it might appear
that a different choice or manner of action would
have been better and safer."
The court refused to give the instruction in whole or
in substance.
This instruction is taken verbatim from the Uniform
Jury Instructions of this State (JIFU No. 15.4). It properly states the law and has direct application to the facts
of the instant case. It is likely that the jury concluded
from the evidence and the court's instructions that the
plaintiff either assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence. The court's refusal to fully instruct the
jury with regard to the law pertaining to contributory negligence and particularly the duty of a person suddenly and
unexpectedly confronted with peril constituted prejudicial
error.
POINT VI.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT
KAY WITH REFERENCE TO CONVERSATIONS, WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE APPELLANT'S INJURIES.
Plaintiff called Kay as an adverse witness. Both he
and the defendant J ongsma had testified that on the night
in question they were frightened and that their acts were
motivated by fear. The plaintiff desired to ask the witness
Kay if he had not, in conversations immediately after the
accident, made statements which indicated that the moti-
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vating force was not fear. In the absence of the jury, the
plaintiff made a proffer of this testimony from the witnesses Mrs. Broadhead, the Plaintiff Ferguson, and from
his wife. These people testified that immediately after the
accident the Defendant Kay returned to the scene and when
threatened with a complaint by the Broadheads stated,
"That if a complaint were filed, he and his gang would
wipe the Broadheads out" (R. 194).
Mrs. Ferguson testified that she had a conversation
with the defendant Kay immediately after the accident,
while he was sitting in the sheriff's car with one of the
deputies and at that time asked if he were the one that
caused "this mess", and he answered, "Yes, I am. What
are you going to do about it, God damn you?"
It is counsel's position that these conversations were
admissible, at least on the issue of credibility.
Kay had testified that he was frightened and "as scared
as a man could be" and that what he did was actuated by
fear. We submit that the court erred in restricting the cross
examination of Kay on this matter. This was a critical
matter for the evidence on either side was in many significant particulars in direct conflict and the credibility of the
witnesses was of considerable importance to the jury.
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CONCLUSION
We submit that the plaintiff is entitled to have his
case submitted to a jury under instructions presenting his
theory of the case and correctly setting forth the law with
regard to contributory negligence, assumption of risk and
the burden of proof. The cause should be reversed with instructions to grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
For VanCott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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